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“Before we consider the character of Hamlet I should like to digress briefly on a 
number of topics. First of all, the modern concept of "personality" was completely 
unknown in the sixteenth century. The Greeks had no such concept, and no word for 
it; in scholastic Latin, personalitas, a word unknown in Classical Latin, meant simply 
the quality of being a man as distinct from being an animal. During the eighteenth 
century the word "personality" came to mean the sum of the characteristics of an 
individual, and in the nineteenth century it became a reified abstraction with depths, 
force, and, eventually, the host of problems, difficulties, and aberrations, which you, 
who have these little things somewhere inside you, now know very well. Any 
psychologist can tell you all about them. You may say, "Oh, but Elizabethans had 
them, even if they didn't mention them!" I can assure you that they belong to the world 
of words, not to the world of things, and that Elizabethans were just as innocent of 
them as they were of Newton's law of attraction, which was once applied to almost 
every conceivable subject by eighteenth-century intellectuals. The theories you 
entertain will pass too, unless the human mind stagnates and everybody believes what 
he is told. 
What our ancestors had instead of personalities, which are, after all "ghosts," were 
characters and immortal souls” 
 A Medievalist looks at Hamlet D. W. Robertson Jr    1980 
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The ink had barely dried on the signatures to the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007 
before the debate started on what it all meant for privacy and data protection. In some 
countries and especially the UK the actual status of the treaty continues to be debated: 
is it a European Constitution in all but name or is it at least a quasi-constitutional 
piece of that part of international law we now term European law? Whatever its 
constitutional status,
1
 the new document reinforces data protection law by dedicating 
a specific section to it at Art.16B.
2
 Separate to the Treaty, in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
3
 both a separate specific section on 
privacy (Art.7) and a section on personal data (Art.8) are maintained. By having these 
two rights side by side, one begs the question “so where do they differ? Are they still 
related and hierarchical…as the preamble to the Council of Europe’s 1981 Data 
Protection Convention would have us believe or, 25 years down the line from launch 
of Convention 108, have they grown distinct? 
Anybody following the development of Data Protection Law across Europe since 
1970 culminating in the EU Directive 46/1995 and the European Charter of Rights in 
2000 could be forgiven if they were to ask “But what are these countries actually 
agreeing to and why?” The UK approach may best be characterised as one of “fair 
information practices” especially in that limbo period between 1984 and 1998 when 
the UK had a data protection law without actually subscribing to a right to privacy at 
English Common law
4
 or constitutional law
5
. Somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum, the vast bulk of continental Europe actually subscribed to privacy as a 
fundamental Human Right in terms of Art 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and viewed data protection as hierarchically one step below that, a kind of 
enabling right which exists to protect the hierarchically one step higher fundamental 
right to “private and family life”. At the other end of the spectrum to the UK one finds 
the Germans where the Constitutional Court in the 1983 census case enunciated the 
“right to informational self-determination”. In this instance the Court was basing itself 
on Arts 1 and 2 of the Grundgesetz, which guarantee the right to dignity, and the right 
to free development of personality, respectively. The simple truth of international 
politics however is that while, say, both the UK and Germany signed up to 
Convention 108 in 1981 and eventually Directive 46 in 1995, at no moment in time 
did they actually do so because they ever agreed on the principle of “informational 
self-determination” or indeed disagreed violently on “fair information practices”. 
Together with the other 21-47
6
 member states of the Council of Europe they agreed to 
a compromise, hammered out at the end of several years of negotiation. As often 
                                                 
1
 For a more detailed examination of the background to the elevation of data protection to 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional status at the European level, see J A Cannataci, J P Mifsud 
Bonnici, “Data Protection Comes of Age: The Data Protection Clauses in the European Constitutional 
Treaty”,  (2005), Vol. 14 (1), Information and Communications Technology Law, pp.5-15.  
2
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 OJ C306 17 December 2007 p51.
3
 OJ C303 14 December 2007 p01. 
4
 See the first edition of R Wacks, The Protection of Privacy, 1980, Sweet & Maxwell for an analysis of why 
the right to privacy had no real historical basis in English common law to the late 20
th
 century. 
5
 Introduced by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
6
 The number of member states grew drastically from the launching of Convention 108 in 1981 to 
2008. 
(2008) 5:1 SCRIPT-ed 
 
3 
happens in such processes the logic of the law that is the final outcome of such 
convoluted international decision-making is not as tidy as it could have been. 
It was at this time, precisely in the last decade of the 20
th
 century, that technology-
driven law was making a notable impact on legal thinking. While the continental 
Europeans were forging ahead with an omnibus approach to data protection and 
pockets of Nordic legal thinkers were plunging deeper into the rationale of privacy 
and personality
7
, in the US leading IT law thinkers like Joel Reidenberg and Larry 
Lessig were proving their adeptness at coining terms like Lex Informatica
8
 or 
reviewing “Code and other laws of cyberspace.” 
The Reidenberg approach was both profound and practical: it took the trans-
jurisdictional needs of medieval Europe which led to the birth of Lex Mercatoria and 
argued that the Internet requires as broad a sweep with the deliberate creation of a Lex 
Informatica. Without necessarily disagreeing with much of what Reidenberg and his 
followers have proposed, I would like, in this short contribution, to go one step 
further, and invite attention to an emerging field of law which I shall, for the sake of 
convenience, dub Lex Personalitatis. By this I mean the “Law of Personality” relating 
to personality rights in a much wider way than that understood by most common law-
based commentators. The latter tend to divide personality rights into two broad 
camps: that of rights over commercial exploitation of image, name etc. and privacy 
rights….By proposing a composite concept of Lex Personalitatis I am seeking to go 
deeper and also encompass the underlying reasons for both image/identity-related 
rights and privacy-related rights. In essence, I am suggesting that we should be 
looking to a supreme value, the individual’s fundamental right to unhindered (or free) 
development of his/her own personality. In this sense Lex Personalitatis is closer in 
conceptual definition to the German Persönlichkeitsrecht, and can be viewed as both 
a fundamental right (ius personalitatis) underpinning much of, and an integral 
component of, Lex Informatica. I would also suggest that legal cultural and language 
barriers have prevented much of the world from understanding the depth and value of 
German legal thinking on the matter over the past 50 years.   
During the first three months of 2008 alone, the German Constitutional Court in 
Karlsruhe has succeeded in contributing not only to the further development of Lex 
Informatica but also strike a blow for the further growth of this new composite right, 
that of ius personalitatis, the right to unhindered development of personality and the 
consequent Lex Personalitatis. It is perhaps high time for legal analysts across Europe 
to start carefully examining the slow domino effect that German law has been having 
across much of central and Eastern Europe over the past 25 years. For a close 
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4 
examination of the legal position in, say, Hungary, Slovenia or Romania would reveal 
that it is not only the Germans who give so much prominence to 
Persönlichkeitsrecht.
9
  Perhaps the 1991 Romanian constitution is the clearest 
indicator of the shape of things to come: it appears to establish a three-tier hierarchy 
at the top of which one finds “supreme values of dignity …and the right to unhindered 
development of personality.” In the second tier immediately below this, one finds 
three constitutional provisions dedicated to information law: Art 26 tackles the right 
to private life, Art 30 the right to freedom of expression and Art 32 the right to access 
public information. These constitutional provisions establish the basis on which the 
third tier of ordinary legislation on data protection or media or freedom of access to 
public files provide the more detailed rules which exist to promote a culture in which 
“ground rules for the access, distribution, and use of information will shape the trust, 
confidence, and fairness in the twenty-first century digital world for citizens, 
businesses, and governments.”
10
 
The primary raison d’être of such complex legal provision is not however to permit 
the use of informatics for trade or leisure. The latter is more likely to be an intended 
by-product. Certainly “informatica” is important, indeed essential for “commercium” 
and hence Lex informatica is certainly very important, but I submit that the raison 
d’etre of the hierarchical structure in Romania just outlined above goes beyond Lex 
Informatica. It is the realisation that the supreme value at law is that of the right of 
dignity and free development of personality, i.e. the ius personalitatis that inspires 
and underpins such law. It is not unnatural for the post-communist countries to use 
their experience of systemic abuse of personal information in 50 years of pre-digital 
communism to nurture a more profound appreciation of why the flow of information 
in society is so important and consequently why its regulation must be subservient to 
the individual’s right to the unhindered development of one’s personality. In doing so 
in the Information Age, they are helping to develop a Lex Personalitatis the scope of 
which is broader than that encapsulated by the term “personality rights” in the Anglo-
Saxon legal world. 
The term “personality rights” in the plural is not unique to the Anglo-Saxon world. 
They are likewise termed to be a plural entity in, say, French or Romanian 
jurisprudence. As suggested previously, the distinction I am drawing here between 
Lex Personalitatis and “personality rights” as understood in much of the Common 
Law world is that Lex Personalitatis is deeper and broader than “personality rights” as 
commonly understood by most English and American lawyers. In 2008-speak it also 
encompasses other concepts such as informational self-determination and the right to 
"a guarantee of confidentiality and integrity in information-technology systems"
11
, 
basing everything on an underlying (and/or over-arching) supreme value of the 
unhindered right to development of personality. In this sense existing rights of 
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 The law of the right to personality. 
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 See note 8. 
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 This was the full name of the latest civil right, introduced by the German Constitutional Court which 
court president Hans-Jürgen Papier admitted was unprecedented in German law. See SPIEGEL 
ONLINE - February 28, 2008, 02:45 PM, at: 
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whatever nature (commercial use of images, informational self-determination, etc.) 
are the current components of the existing corpus that constitutes Lex Personalitiatis. 
In Germany, like France and the US, personality rights were largely born out of 
technological development, this time the birth of photography in the nineteenth 
century. The 1898 Bismarck case around unauthorised images of a person led to the 
1907 copyright clauses in the Kunsturhebergesetz (Law on Copyright in Arts) in §22 
which granted rights to an individual captured in a portrait.
12
  
Across the border in France, whereas the Napoleonic Civil Code of 1804 ignored 
personality rights, the technology of film and the endless pursuit of actress Brigitte 
Bardot brought changes to French law by the last quarter of the twentieth century.
13
 In 
the US, the term "right of publicity" appears to have been coined by Judge Jerome 
Frank in the 1953 case Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v Topps Chewing Gum, Inc..
14
  
While some debate has been fuelled by the furore over privacy, most of the focus of 
the US debate has been on the right to commercialization of images and the right to 
charge for or bar entirely the commercial exploitation of name, likeness, voice or 
"personality." German case law developments have not been immune to such 
concerns as evident in the recent case of Princess Caroline
15
 but have tended to go 
much further than anybody else in developing Lex Personalitatis.  In a nutshell, the 
German “judiciary” has derived a general right of personality (“allgemeines 
Persönlichkeitsrecht”) from the rights enshrined in Articles 1 I  and 2 I of the German 
constitution (Grundgesetz). It provides protection to valuable 
aspects/qualities/attributes (Eigenschaften) of the human personality 
(“Persönlichkeitsgüter”) not already protected elsewhere (eg by §828 I BGB) and 
forms a final barrier against the erosion/penetration of privacy in the personal domain. 
The right has constitutional rank and includes a right to informational self-
determination” (“informationelle  Selbstbestimmung”).  In the event of a conflict 
between a person’s own sphere of personality (“Eigensphäre der Persönlichkeit) and 
the legitimate interest of others, it must (again) be resolved by balancing”.
16
  
Of note, in Germany, the “allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht” is treated as “sonstiges 
Recht” (absolute right) in §823 I 1 BGB. It is a framework right (“Rahmenrecht”) 
and supplements the special Personality rights (“besondere Persönlichkeitsrechte” ) 
expressly mentioned in §823 BGB and in other statutory provisions (eg. the right to 
one’s name (§12 BGB) and the right to one’s picture (§22ff KUG).
17
 While the 1983 
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 An individual can decide on whether the picture should be published or not. The statute contains 
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Census case which produced “informational self-determination” remains the landmark 
example
18
 the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe has striven to outdo itself in 2008. 
Firstly, in February, it virtually established a new right to on-line privacy. “The 
German Constitutional Court ruled that a surveillance law passed in 2007 in the state 
of North Rhine-Westphalia gave police and state officials too much power to spy on 
citizens using "trojan horse" software, which can be delivered by e-mail and used to 
scan the contents of a hard drive. Not only did the law violate the right to privacy, the 
court said, but it also violated a basic right for a citizen using a computer with an 
Internet connection to "a guarantee of confidentiality and integrity in information-
technology systems."
19
 Then, within a month, in March 2008, it struck the first major 
blow against the EU Data Retention Directive. “After 30,000 Germans filed a class-
action suit, Germany's constitutional court in Karlsruhe blocked large parts of a new 
data-collection bill lawmakers say will help stop terror attacks… The law gave the 
federal government broad access to stored telephone and Internet data -- including e-
mail addresses, length of call and numbers dialled -- for a six-month period. In the 
case of cell phone calls, service providers could potentially save data on the location 
calls were made from. The law went into effect in January 2008. But in March the 
German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe issued an injunction against it, declaring 
parts of the law unconstitutional pending further review”.
20
 
In spite of the considerable lead it has taken in such matters in Europe, Germany’s 
thrust on ius personalitatis is still very much work-in-progress…while the entire 
subject of Lex Personalitatis cries out for a structured and purposeful debate at the 
highest levels across Europe. Had this happened earlier perhaps we would not have 
ended up with two different sections, one on private life and the other on data 
protection, in the Charter on Fundamental Rights but possibly a more carefully 
thought-out over-arching, pan-European principle of ius personalitatis. As things 
stand, some countries are developing and  embracing Lex Personalitatis while others 
profess to go for “fair information practices” but implicitly or explicitly reject the 
notion that ius personalitatis exists in their law.  The extent to which technology and 
concerns about technology will drive change in either direction remains to be seen but 
Elizabethan non-issues about personality will doubtless come to mind as more and 
more EU member states will follow Germany’s lead in their attempt to reconcile 
“why” we have data protection with “how” we’re going to achieve it. 
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